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PROTECTED WORK REFUSALS UNDER SECTION 105(c)(1)





Section 105(c)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, ("Mine
Act" or "Act") makes actionable any discrimination against a miner who com-
plains of unsafe or unhealthful conditions in a mine, or who exercises other
identified protected rights. Although refusals to work are not specifically included
in the list of rights identified in section 105(c)(1), the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission ("Commission") and the courts have consistently held
that the right to refuse to work under unsafe or unhealthful mine conditions is
protected.2 This conclusion is based on powerful legislative history indicating that
Congress intended section 105(c)(1) to afford such a right.
3
Because both the statute and the legislative history are silent as to the cir-
cumstances under which a work refusal is protected, the task of defining the
contours of the right has been left almost entirely to the Commission and the
courts. In general, the parameters established by these bodies appear to be both
clear and workable. However, these parameters fall short in one important respect:
after nearly a decade of litigation applying the refusal to work principle, neither
the Commission nor the courts have established any standard for how severe or
immediate a hazard must be to justify a protected work refusal. The problem is
that, in a business in which hazards are a way of life, almost any "hazard"
arguably may justify a protected work refusal. There must be a limit.
* Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1962, Georgetown University; J.D.
1971, Catholic University.
** Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1969, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1978,
George Washington University.
*** Associate, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1979, Harvard University; J.D. 1983,
Harvard University.
30 U.S.C. §§ 801 to -962 (1982).
2 E.g., Secretary of Labor ex rel. Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2786
(1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211 (3rd
Cir. 1981); Miller v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 687 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1982);
Brock v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 766 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1985); Ottawa Silica Co. v. Secretary
of Labor, 780 F.2d 1022, 3 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) 2001 (6th Cir. 1985); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 795 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1986).
See S. RP. No. 181, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 35-36 (1977).
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Five years ago when Judge James A. Broderick and Mr. Daniel Minahan
described the state of the Mine Act's anti-discrimination law in these pages, they
described a doctrine "still in its infancy." ' 4 Even at this early date, however,
Broderick and Minahan warned of the problems that could arise if the Com-
mission failed to adopt a threshold standard of severity and imminence for hazards
sufficient to trigger the Act's protections for a refusal to work.' Today that warn-
ing stands unheeded and, as a result, a doctrine no longer in its infancy poses
an unnecessary threat to mine discipline.
We take the occasion of the Act's first decennial to evaluate the development
of this important right. Part II of this Article examines the general contours of
protected work refusals, as they have grown up in the decisions of the Commission
and the courts. Part III considers the need for a severity standard to limit pro-
tected work refusals to circumstances in which they are actually justified.
II. Tin CONTOURS OF A PROTECTED WORK REFUSAL
A miner has the right under section 105(c) of the Mine Act to refuse work, if
the miner has a good faith, reasonable belief in a hazardous condition .... How-
ever, this right is not unconditional. Where reasonably possible, a miner refusing
work should ordinarily communicate or attempt to communicate to some rep-
resentative of the operator his belief that a safety or health hazard exists .... I
There are four basic prerequisites to a protected refusal to work: the miner
must have a (1) good faith, (2) reasonable belief that (3) a hazardous condition
exists, and he must ordinarily (4) communicate that belief to a representative of
the operator. In some circumstances, the miner also may engage in affirmative
self-help, or act to safeguard the health and safety of others. Even if the miner
engages in protected conduct, of course, no action lies against the operator unless
he unjustifiably retaliates against the miner on the basis of the protected conduct.
This section will address each of the four basic elements of a protected work
refusal, the requirements for affirmative self-help and the protection of others,
and the proof of discriminatory action and causation.
A. Good Faith Belief
The first prerequisite to a protected right to refuse to work is a good faith
belief that a hazard exists. In this context, "good faith" simply means "honest
belief that a hazard exists." ' 7 The purpose of this requirement is to remove from
4 Broderick & Minahan, Employment Discrimination under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act, 84 W. VA. L. REv. 1023, 1066 (1982).
Id. at 1036-38.
Hogan v. Emerald Mines Corp., 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) 1056, 1060 (1986) (citations omitted).
Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061; Secretary of Labor ex rel. Robinette v. United
Castle Coal Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 803, 810 (1981).
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PROTECTED WORK REFUSALS
the Act's protection "refusals involving fraud or other forms of deception." s As
the Commission has explained, such conduct is not deserving of protection and
has no place under the Act. 9
Good faith must be viewed from the miner's perspective. 0 Thus, the question
is not whether there actually was a hazard, but whether the miner thought there
was a hazard. In most cases, the question of good faith is likely to turn on the
credibility of the miner's own testimony," but circumstantial evidence may also
be brought to bear. Relevant evidence in this regard may include evidence in the
miner's personnel history "suggesting a likelihood of pretext or ulterior motive"
for the refusal to work.' 2 A miner's failure to take simple safety precautions to
eliminate a perceived hazard, for example, indicates pretext or bad faith.' The
Third Circuit has stated that "[q]uestions of imminence and degree of injury"
may also bear upon the sincerity of a miner's belief.'
4
B. Reasonable Belief
The Commission has rejected any requirement of "objective evidence" that
an abnormally dangerous condition actually exists as a prerequisite for a miner's
protected refusal to work.' 5 As the Commission explained, dangerous conditions
may develop quickly, and a miner cannot always await objective evidence of a
hazard before he acts:
Unsafe conditions can occur suddenly and in remote sections of mines; the miner
in question may be the only immediate witness; and physical evidence may be
elusive. Situations are also bound to arise where outward appearances suggest a
dangerous condition which closer subsequent investigation does not confirm. Fur-
thermore .... such a test would chill the miner's exercise of the right to refuse
to work, an outcome inconsistent with the Act's legislative history favoring a
broad right in a uniquely hazardous working environment. Miners should be able
to respond quickly to reasonably perceived threats, and mining conditions may
not permit painstaking validation of what appears to be a danger.'
6
Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061; Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 810.
Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 810-11.
10 Secretary of Labor ex rel. Pratt v. River Hurricane Coal Co., 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1529, 1533
(1983).
1 Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 811 n.14; see id. at 813-14.
12 Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061.
" E.g., Frame v. Consolidation Coal Co., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1192 (1985) (failure to request gloves);
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Ferrell v. R&E Coal Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2917, 2924 (1981) (failure to
hang curtains).
4 Consolidation Coal Co., 663 F.2d at 1219.
" Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061; Pratt, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1533; Haro v. Magma
Copper Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1935, 1944 (1982); Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 811-12.
36 Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 811-12.
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However, the Commission has held that a miner's good faith belief in the
existence of a hazard is not sufficient alone to create a right to refuse to work:
the good faith belief also must be reasonable. The Commission has not required
that the miner's perception be the only reasonable belief, but rather that it be
"a reasonable one under the circumstances.' 17 Reasonableness, like good faith,
turns largely on the miner's own testimony, which "can be evaluated for its detail,
inherent logic, and overall credibility."' 8 The Commission will also permit the
introduction of "corroborative physicial, testimonial, or expert evidence" insofar
as it bears upon the reasonableness of the miner's belief.' 9
When an operator specifically addresses a miner's safety complaints and either
cures them or demonstrates that they are unfounded, a continuing refusal to work
becomes unreasonable. 20 However, evidence that a safety problem did not exist
or had been eliminated is not relevant unless it was, or should have been, known
to the miner at the time of his refusal to work.2' For this reason, an explanation
or attempt to address a miner's fears should include specific information and
support as to why there is in fact no problem.22 The key rule is that reasonableness
must be evaluated "from the viewpoint of the refusing miner at the time of
refusal. "
C. A Hazardous Condition
The right to refuse to work arises only when a miner has a reasonable, good
faith belief that "a hazard exists." 24 As discussed in part III, the Commission's
decisions provide minimal guidance, at best, as to how severe a condition must
be to constitute a hazard. The Commission appears to have shied away from this
issue, leaving an almost complete dearth of cases on the definition of "a hazard."
Some of the Commission's "reasonableness" cases, however, appear to reach
the issue of whether a given condition could constitute a hazard. On the one
hand, the Commission has held that a hazard may be found even if the danger
11 Pratt, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1533; Haro, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1944; Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C.
at 812.
11 Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 812.
19 Id.
11 Secretary of Labor ax rel. Bush v. Union Carbide Corp., 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. 993, 996, 998-99
(1983).
21 E.g., Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061; Secretary of Labor ex rel. Cameron v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 319, 320-21 (1985), aff'd sub nom. Consolidation Coal
Co., 795 F.2d 364; Bradley v. Belva Coal Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 982, 992 (1982).
- Pratt, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1534.
Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061 (emphasis added).
24 Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 810.
[Vol. 89
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss3/5
PROTECTED WORK REFUSALS
perceived by the miner arises out of his own physical limitations25 or exhaustion.26
The fact that no regulation or other safety standard has been violated does not
necessarily mean that there is no hazard sufficient to support a protected work
refusal 27
On the other hand, a generalized complaint about mine conditions that "al-
ways pose[ ] some element of risk" will not justify a refusal to work. 28 As one
administrative law judge has explained, "[r]easonableness requires, at a minimum,
that the miner's refusal to work concern a condition actually confronting him at
the time.''29 Beyond this limited case law, the Commission's decisions are virtually
silent on the issue of what does, or does not, constitute a hazard.
D. Communication of Complaint
The final prerequisite to a protected work refusal is that the miner must
ordinarily communicate his safety complaint to the operator before he stops work.
30
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the communication requirement is:
[A] device well suited to promoting the Act's fundamental objective of promoting
mine safety and health. It gives the worker an incentive to bring a safety hazard
to his employer's attention, for by doing so he gains the protection of the Act
against retaliation (provided that his belief that there is a hazard is reasonable).
The requirement also serves an evidentiary purpose: it helps the Commission dis-
tinguish between genuine and spurious invocations of the Act's protections. The
worker who does not promptly report an alleged hazard to his employer is less
likely to be sincere in his belief that there is a hazard than the worker who does.
31
2 Bjes v. Consolidation Coal Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1411, 1417 (1984); see United Mine Workers
ex rel. Harvey v. Kitt Energy Corp., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1034 (1985) (no credible evidence of back
ailment). On the other hand, a miner's own inexperience will not ordinarily serve as the basis for a
protected refusal to work. Sammons v. Mine Services Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1391 (1984); Cameron,
7 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 324; Secretary of Labor ex rel. Kilgore v. Pilot Coal Co., 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 504
(1980).
Eldridge v. Sunfire Coal Co., 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. 408 (1983).
27 Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1061 n.3.
Bush, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 999; see United Mine Workers ex rel. Simmons v. Southern Ohio
Coal Co., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1584, 1589 (1982) (work refused was "not more risky or dangerous per
se than any other job in the mine.").
Secretary of Labor ex rel. Duncan v. T.K. Jessup, Inc., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1880 (1981); see
Tenney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2681, 2702 (1981) (no right of work refusal
because "no specific place in the mine [has been] mentioned [and no] specific safety hazard... has
been raised in this proceeding.").
30 Miller, 687 F.2d at 194; Secretary of Labor ex rel. Dunmire v. Northern Coal Co., 4
F.M.S.H.RC. 126 (1982).
1, Miller, 687 F.2d at 196. The Commission held that a communication requirement was man-
dated by Congress' intent that the right of protected work refusals extend to miners who act "as
responsible human beings": "In our view, it would not be the conduct of a 'responsible human being'
to walk off the job and, for no good reason, fail to inform anyone of a possible hazard that could
imperil safety or health." Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 133.
1987]
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The communication requirement has three subparts: a miner must ordinarily
communicate his safety complaint to his employer (1) if reasonably possible, (2)
before refusing to work, and (3) in terms that will convey to his employer the
general nature of the hazard that the miner believes exists. The "reasonable pos-
sibility" requirement is intended to allow workers some flexibility to deal with
circumstances that require swift reaction.32 For example, there may be circum-
stances in which no advance communication is possible because no representative
of the operator is readily available. 3
In addition, there may be occasions on which a complaint to the operator
would be futile. 34 The Commission has emphasized that futility cannot be assumed
and will not be found absent "exceptional circumstances. ' ' 3s As the Commission
explained, "[plossible operator awareness of a hazardous condition does not mean
that upon complaint by a miner an operator will continue to ignore its duty to
correct the hazard."6 For this reason, even if the miner cannot communicate his
complaint before his work refusal, he must report it reasonably soon thereafter. 37
In general, any communication sufficient to put the operator on "notice of
the hazard that the miner believes exists" will be sufficient. 3 Communications
should be evaluated in a "common sense, not legalistic, manner, ' 39 "not only
in terms of the specific words used, but also in terms of the circumstances within
which the words are used."'' The Commission has held that communication may
involve "speech, action, gesture, or tying in with others' comments" and a com-
munication from one miner "may be deemed to be on behalf of all concerned,
even if not announced in such terms."'4 In short, the communication requirement
is vital to a protected work refusal, but is easily met.
32 Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 133. The Commission explained this requirement as follows:
Where reasonably possible, a miner refusing work should ordinarily communicate, or
at least attempt to communicate, to some representative of the operator his belief in the
safety or health hazard at issue. "Reasonable possibility" may be lacking where, for ex-
ample, a representative of the operator is not present, or exigent circumstances require swift
reaction. We also have used the word "ordinarily" in our formulation to indicate that even
where such communication is reasonably possible, unusual circumstances-such as futility-
may excuse a failure to communicate. If possible, the communication should ordinarily be
made before the work refusal, but, depending on circumstances, may also be made rea-




3s Simpson v. Kenta Energy Corp., 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) 1023, 1027 (1986).
Id. at 1028.
37 Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 133; Simpson, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1027.
31 Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1063.
3' Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 134.
40 Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1063.
1 Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 134.
[Vol. 89
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E. Affirmative Self-Help and Help of Others
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Marshall,42 the Third Circuit held that the
Mine Act does not provide a right to take affirmative steps to protect fellow workers.
In Marshall, the Commission found that the complaining miner had a reasonable,
good faith belief that the continued operation of a damaged, and thus abnormally
loud mining machine would threaten his hearing.' 3 The court of appeals
did not dispute the Commission's holding that the miner's refusal to work
under these circumstances was protected, but found that the miner also had shut
down the machine so that other miners could not operate it.44 The court held
that this affirmative action to prevent others from operating a dangerous machine
was not protected:
While Pasula may have had a right to walk off the job pursuant to section
105(c)(1) of the Mine Act, because of a good faith belief that there was a danger
to his health and safety, he went further and shut down the continuous miner
machine so that no one else on his shift could work. Pasula did not have a right
to close down the continuous miner machine in such a manner....
[I]t is still clear that the Mine Act does not provide for the right to shut down
equipment so that other miners may not work. There is no right in the Act to
shut down an entire shift's work. An individual is protected by the Act from
retaliation for asserting and acting on his real fear that conditions are unsafe or
hazardous to his health; but no one has the right to stop others from proceeding
to work if they so wish.'
The subsequent decisions of the Commission have moved away from the thrust
of Marshall and affirmed that miners have both the right to engage in affirmative
self-help and the right to refuse to work for the protection of others. First, in
Robinette v. United Castle Coal Co., the Commission held that a miner has
the right to engage in affirmative self-help on the same conditions as he may refuse
to work: a reasonable, good faith belief that affirmative actions is necessary." 6 The
Commission's only additional requirement is that the miner show that "his
42 Marshall, 663 F.2d at 1221.
,3 Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2793.
" Marshall, 663 F.2d at 1214, 1216.
45 Id. at 1213, 1219 (emphasis in original). The Commission also stated that Pasula's actions
in shutting down the machine were "presumably unprotected," but found insufficient evidence that
Pasula would have been fired for engaging "only in the unprotected activity." Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C.
at 2796.
41 Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 812.
1987]
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affirmative action was a reasonable approach under the circumstances to
eliminating or protecting against the perceived hazard.
'1 7
Second, in Cameron v. Consolidation Coal Co., the Commission held that a
miner may refuse any work assignment that would jeopardize a co-worker's safety
or health." The Commission recognized a mine operator's need "to maintain its
ability to control its workforce effectively," and, therefore, refused to protect
"so-called 'sympathy' work stoppages." 9 For this reason, the Commission required
not only a reasonable, good faith belief of a hazard to another miner, but also
"a direct nexus" between the refusing miner's work assignment and the feared."
As the Commission explained, refusal to work on behalf of another is protected
only "if such refusal is necessary to prevent [the refusing miner's] personal par-
ticipation in the creation of a danger to others."'" The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the Commission's Cameron decision as to both the right to refuse
work for the protection of others and the "direct nexus" requirement.5 "
The Cameron and Marshall decisions are only superficially inconsistent. A
miner's right to engage in affirmative action and his right to refuse work that
could injure another do not carry as a necessary corollary the right to engage in
affirmative action on behalf of others, as did the miner in Marshall. Certainly,
nothing in Cameron states or implies that a miner may actively interfere with the
work of another miner when there is no danger to himself. On the contrary, the
Commission's "direct nexus" and "personal participation" requirements appear
to confirm that a miner has a right to restrict only his own actions, and not those
" Id. The Commission attempted to harmonize the Third Circuit's Marshall decision by asserting
that the miner's actions in that case had been "unreasonable and excessive":
We do not regard the court's disposition of the discrimination issue as a holding that
a miner may never engage in affirmative self-help such as shutting off or adjusting equip-
ment. The court obviously believed that the miner's actions were unreasonable and excessive.
Robinette stressed that any affirmative self-help must be reasonable .... Given the court's
own emphasis on reasonableness, we doubt that it would have condemned a miner's rea-
sonable action in, for example, temporarily shutting down a beltline to prevent a fire.
Rather, we think that the court's opinion is entirely consistent with a case-by-case analysis
of work refusals, including those that involve affirmative self-help, focused on the rea-
sonableness of the miner's beliefs and actions.
Dunmire, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 131-32 n.12 (citation omitted).
,2 Cameron, 7 F.M.S.H.R.C, at 322. In Cameron, the miner believed that his operation of a
train with an inadequate braking system would endanger another miner riding on the trailing loco-
motive. Id. at 320 & n.2. The Commission found support for this protection in the language of the
Act itself, which prohibits discrimination against a miner because of his exercise of a statutory right




1 Consolidation Coal Co., 795 F.2d 364.
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of others. Under these tests, and the Commission's general "reasonableness" re-
quirements, there is little doubt that the Marshall case would be decided the same
way today as it was in 1981.
F. Discrimination and Causation
Finally, the existence of a protected work refusal alone is not sufficient to
support a cause of action against a mine operator: the complaining miner also
must show that he was discriminated against because of the protected work re-
fusal. Under the Commission's decisions, a miner who engaged in a protected
work refusal establishes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by dem-
onstrating that some adverse action of his employer was motivated in any part
by the protected activity." If the miner succeeds in establishing a prima facie
case, the operator may defend affirmatively by proving that (1) the adverse action
was also motivated by the miner's unprotected activity, and (2) the unprotected
activity alone would have been sufficient to support the adverse action.5 4 The
Commission has emphasized that although the intermediate burden of coming
forward with evidence shifts to the operator when a prima facie case has been
established, the " 'ultimate burden of persuasion' on the question of discrimi-
nation rests with the complainant and never 'shifts.' ""
A prima facie case of discriminatory intent may be established exclusively
through circumstantial evidence.16 The most common indicia of discriminatory
intent are: (1) knowledge that the miner has engaged in protected activities; 57 (2)
hostility toward the protected activities; (3) coincidence of timing between the
protected activities and the adverse action; and (4) disparate treatment of the
miner engaging in the protected activities. 58 The Commission has held that a miner
need not prove disparate treatment to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. 9 Knowledge of the miner's protected activity is "probably the single most
" Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2799; Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1060.
Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2799-2800; Hogan, 4 Mine S. H. Cas. (BNA) at 1060.
" Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 818 n.20. The so-called "Pasula-Robinette test" for unlawful
discrimination has been approved by at least two circuit courts of appeal. See Donovan v. Stafford
Const. Co., 732 F.2d 954, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Boich v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 719 F.2d 194, 195-96 (6th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has approved a virtually identical
analysis for discrimination cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Trans-
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1983).
51 Secretary of Labor exrel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2508, 2510 (1981),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Donovan ex rel. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). As the Commission explained, "[d]irect evidence of motivation is rarely encountered."
Id.
57 Indeed, a miner may prove unlawful discrimination by showing that an operator discriminated
against him because it believed that he had engaged in protected activity, even when the miner in
fact had not. Moses v. Whitley Development Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1475, 1480 (1982).
18 Chacon, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2510.
' Id. at 2513.
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important aspect of a circumstantial case,'"'6 and may itself be proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence.
6'
Once the miner has established a prima facie case, the operator can respond
by showing that the miner would have been disciplined in any case for legitimate
business reasons, such as the miner's unsatisfactory work record, 62 incompetence,63
or violation of company rules and practices.6 In at least two cases, the Com-
mission has suggested that a miner's improper behavior in the course of a work
refusal could serve as a legitimate basis for discipline. 65 The Commission has
emphasized that it will not "pass on the wisdom or fairness of such asserted
business justifications,' ' but rather will determine only whether they are "pre-
textual." 67 As the Commission explained, a judge has no business "substitut[ing]
his business judgment or sense of 'industrial justice' for that of the operator. 68
Once it appears that a proffered business justification is not plainly incredible or
implausible, a finding of pretext is inappropriate. We and our judges should not
substitute for the operator's business judgment our views on 'good' business prac-
tice or on whether a particular adverse action was 'just' or 'wise.' "69
Of course, it is not enough for the operator to show that the miner could
have been disciplined for other reasons; he must demonstrate that the miner's
unprotected activities were an actual motivating factor and would alone have
justified the adverse action taken:
It is not sufficient for the employer to show that the miner deserved to have been
fired for engaging in the unprotected activity; if the unprotected activity did not
originally concern the employer enough to have resulted in the same adverse ac-
tion, we will not consider it. The employer must show that he did in fact consider
I0 d. at 2510; see Schulte v. Lizza Indus. Inc., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 8, 15 (1984).
61 Schulte, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 15. Knowledge of a protected activity, in coincidence with adverse
action alone, may be enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 15-16.
Bradley, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 993; see Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 819 (" 'inferior' work").
63 Sammons, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1398. The operator need not prove that the miner was actually
incompetent, only that he was fired because he was believed to be incompetent. Id. at 1398 n.5.
Mooney v. Sohio Western Mining Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 510, 514 (1984); Schulte, 6
F.M.S.H.R.C. at 16-17; Chacon, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2514-17.
65 Haro, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1941 (miner's actions were allegedly "duplicitous and dissembling,"
and "broke the 'chain of command' "); Secretary of Labor ex rel. Cooley v. Ottawa Silica Co., 6
F.M.S.H.R.C. 516, 520-21 (1984), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Ottawa Silica Co., 780 F.2d 1022, 3
Mine S. H. Cas. 03NA) 2001 (6th Cir. 1985) ("profanity" and "opprobrious conduct" in the course
of work refusal).
Bradley, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 993.
67 Haro, 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1938.
63 Id.
Chacon, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2516. Although Chacon was reversed by the D.C. Circuit on its
facts, nothing in the court of appeals opinion indicates that the Commission's decision to abstain
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the employee deserving of discipline for engaging in the unprotected activity done
and that he would have disciplined him in any event."
The question whether an operator would have disciplined the miner for un-
protected activities alone frequently turns on the credibility of the operator's own
testimony.7' However, the Commission may also undertake "a limited exami-
nation" of the "substantiality" of the proffered justification." In this regard,
the operator may demonstrate the existence of personnel rules and practices for-
bidding the practice in question, the miner's knowledge of these rules or practices,
prior warnings to the miner, or past discipline consistent with that meted out to
the complaining miner.
7 3
III. TOWARD A STANDARD OF SEVERITY AND IMMINENCE FOR PROTECTED
WORK REusALs
The case law outlined above provides a generally workable and equitable
balance between the interests of miners and those of mine operators. On the one
hand, miners are protected in their right to refuse to work in conditions that they
reasonably-and genuinely-believe to be unsafe or unhealthy. On the other hand,
mine operators may safely discipline miners who are insubordinate, inconipetent,
or violate established work rules. Both mine safety and mine discipline are well
served by this balance.
The number of refusal to work cases has mushroomed in recent years, how-
ever, and it appears that work refusals have become a substitute for, rather than
a supplement to, the statutory measures designed to address miner complaints.
The fundamental problem is the lack of any standard for identifying those hazards
that are sufficiently severe and imminent to justify a protected work refusal. The
Commission has consistently failed to establish any such standard, and by falling
to do so it may have unnecessarily tipped the balance away from and undercut
mine discipline in an area in which no vital safety concerns are even at stake.
The need for some clearly articulated standard of severity and immediacy for
hazards justifying protected work refusals is addressed in this concluding section
of the Article.
A. The Absence of a Severity Standard
From the time that it first found an implied right to refuse work in 1980,
the Commission has consistently declined to address the issue of whether the right
11 Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2800 (emphasis in original).
7, Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 820.
72 Chacon, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2516 (emphasis in original).
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should be limited to hazards of some severity and immediacy.74 Thus, the Com-
mission, in its initial Pasula decision, 7 held that a miner's work refusal right
could not be limited to the terms of his union contract, which authorized work
refusals in the face of conditions that "could reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious physical harm." ' 76 Instead, the Commission decided only that the
hazard faced by Pasula was "sufficiently severe whether or not the right to refuse
work is limited to hazards of some severity."' 77 Three years later, the Commission
again expressly declined to articulate any severity standard, insisting that it would
instead rely upon "gradual" development of the law in the cases before it as
"the appropriate vehicle for molding this important right."78
As a result of this silence on the part of the Commission, virtually any hazard,
no matter how inconsequential, could arguably support a protected work refusal.
Recent cases before the Commission and its administrative law judges appear to
trivialize the right, and play into the hands of miners who would abuse it. In
Cooley v. Ottawa Silica Co.,79 for example, a miner was discharged, at least in
part,8" for his refusal to manually light the pilot on a large, natural gas operated
sand dryer.8 ' The Commission found that Cooley had performed this task on at
least thirty prior occasions with only a single incident, in which he had "singed
the hair on the knuckles of his right hand. '8 2 Indeed numerous other workers
had performed the same task, and were "personally unconcerned with the
danger.''83 The Commission made no finding that any consequence greater than
singed knuckle hair was likely to result from manual lighting of the pilot, and
indeed failed to discuss the severity issue at all. Nonetheless, the Commission
found that Cooley had a reasonable good faith belief that a "hazard" existed;
therefore, his work refusal was protected .
4
1, See Broderick & Minahan, supra note 4, at 1036-38.
7 Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2786.
6 Id. at 2794.
" Id. at 2793, see Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 816.
78 Pratt, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1533.
79 Cooley, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 516.
- Cooley "had a history of absenteeism, work refusals, and insubordination, and was nearing
the conclusion of a one-year disciplinary probation when he was discharged." Id. at 517. Further,
he engaged in "profanity" and "opprobrious conduct" in the course of his work refusal. Id. at 520.
The Commission found that Cooley would not have been discharged for this unprotected conduct
alone. Id.
S, Id. at 517.
82 Id.
13 Id. at 519.
14 Id. at 518. See also Perando v. Mettiki Coal Corp., 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 364 (1986) (review
pending) (miner's extended absence from underground work after diagnosis of bronchitis (but not
pneumoconiosis) held to be protected work refusal, entitling miners to transfer to dust free job at
no loss of pay).
[Vol. 89
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B. The Need for a Severity Standard
After Cooley, it may become virtually impossible for mine operators to main-
tain any semblance of discipline among their employees. Miners like Cooley, who
have records of repeated insubordination, will be able to refuse any assignment
that would pose a slight risk of even such minor injury as a cut, scrape, or bruise.
85
These miners cannot be required to do their jobs, and will not be subject to any
form of discipline. The problems this rule poses for mine operators cannot be
overstated: virtually any job in a coal mine poses some degree of risk to health
and safety; so in theory, virtually any work could be refused.
8 6
The Commission's requirement of a good faith, reasonable belief does not
resolve this problem. For example, a miner may have a good faith, reasonable
belief that a minor, insignificant hazard exists. Similarly, he may have a good
faith, reasonable belief that performing a task on a repeated basis could subject
him to a health risk at some point in the undetermined future. In either case,
he would almost certainly have options available to him to address the risk short
of refusing to work. In either case, however, the miner's belief that "a hazard
exists" would be reasonable, and the Commission's standards for a protected
work refusal would be met. In short, the Commission has required only that the
miner's belief be reasonable, not that his refusal to work on the basis of that
belief be reasonable.
Under these circumstances, any mine operator who disciplines a miner for
refusing work assignments on the basis of even the flimsiest excuse could be
subject to protracted litigation and second-guessing by the Commission and the
courts. Moreover, the operator would not be able to prevail simply by showing
that the excuses offered by the miner were flimsy-he would have to demonstrate
that the miner lacked a "good faith belief" that even an insignificant or remote
hazard existed. Proof of a pretextual motive is likely to be extremely difficult.
In any case, this standard provides absolutely no guidance for the miners and
mine operators who must resolve questions of discipline on a daily basis.
This extraordinary right of miners to walk off the job for the most minimal
reason is not required by either the Mine Act or its legislative history. As the
Commission has acknowleged, the language of section 105(c)(1) of the Act does
not by its terms protect any work refusal.87 Under a similarly worded provision
11 E.g., Bjes, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1411 (knee banged against steering column of shuttle car because
of placement of brake pedal).
As explained above, a miner must point to a concrete hazard that actually faces him at the
time of his refusal to work. See supra notes 28, 29, and accompanying text. As mine conditions are
rarely if ever "normal," however, the creative miner is not likely to be hard pressed to find some
"hazard."
Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2789.
19871
13
Biddle et al.: Protected Work Refusals under Section 105(c)(1) of the Mine Safet
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA")," the Secretary
of Labor has afforded workers a limited right to refuse work, but only in instances
in which "there is a real danger of death or serious injury."8 9 The legislative
history of the Mine Act, unlike that of OSHA, clearly indicates that Congress
intended that section 105(c)(1) be construed to accord miners a right to refuse
work. 90 However, the legislative history is silent on the issue of how severe or
imminent a hazard must be before a miner may refuse work. It does not state
that any hazard, no matter how small, will support a protected work refusal.
And it certainly does not state that a miner may refuse work even when he has
less drastic alternatives available to him.
In many instances, the miner does have a less drastic alternative available:
the statute affords him the right to obtain a federal inspection of the mine if he
has reason to believe that a safety violation or imminent danger exists. 9' If the
federal inspector finds that the Act has been violated, he may order the condition
be corrected.9 2 If the inspector finds that the violation creates an imminent danger,
he may order the area closed until the condition is corrected. 93 In cases such as
Cooley, in which the allegedly unsafe condition continues over a period of months
with no imminent danger of severe injury, these safety mechanisms provide the
miner with ample opportunity to remedy a problem without refusing to work.
The Supreme Court has held that the existence of an effective worker com-
plaint mechanism under OSHA supports the limitation of the implied work refusal
right under that Act to cases of severe and imminent conditions.94 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that a similar distinction between protected
complaints and protected work refusals should be drawn under the Mine Act:
A complaint does not disrupt the operations of a mine, so even frivolous com-
plaints impose few costs on the employer. But a work stoppage is invariably a
source of significant cost. Thinking our way as best we can into the minds of
the Senators and Representatives who voted for the 1977 amendments, we can
imagine them wanting to allow miners to complain freely about the conditions
of safety and health in the mine without having to worry about retaliation if the
complaint was later determined to have been frivolous yet at the same time not
wanting to render mine operators powerless to deal with miners who, simply by
alleging a hazard to safety and health, claim a privilege to walk off the job without
notice. We are unwilling to impress on a statute that does not explicitly entitle
Occupational Safety & Health Act § 11(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982).
19 29 C.F.R. 1977.12 (1986).
90 S. REP. No. 181, supra note 3, at 35-36.
9, Mine Act § 103(g)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 813(g)(1) (1982).
92 Mine Act § 103(b), (d), 30 U.S.C. § 813(b), (d) (1982).
91 Mine Act § 107, 30 U.S.C § 817 (1982).
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980).
[Vol. 89
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miners to stop work a construction that would make it impossible to maintain
discipline in the mines.93
On this basis, the Seventh Circuit determined that both the miner's belief in the
existence of a hazard, and his decision to stop work must be reasonable under
the circumstances. 96
In one of its earliest decisions addressing the scope of the newly-fashioned
work refusal right, the Commission refused to limit this right to cases in which
death or serious injury appeared imminent. 97 While OSHA "must apply nationally
to a wide range of typical jobs and work settings," the Commission reasoned,
"the Mine Act applies more narrowly to one of the nation's most hazardous
occupations and working environments. ' 98 This distinction may well justify, as
the Commission suggested, "a broader and simpler definition" of the work refusal
right under the Mine Act. 99 However, it cannot support the absence of any severity
standard. The fact that a miner faces more dangerous conditions than other work-
ers does not make his cuts, scrapes, and bruises more dangerous than those of
any other worker. The fact that a miner must occasionally make snap judgments
as to the severity of a hazard does not mean that he should be entitled to refuse
work when he decides-after several months-that the risk of singed hair on his
knuckles is just too much to bear.
In its initial decision creating the right of protected work refusals, the Com-
mission held that this right was necessary because a miner's statutory remedies
"would be hollow indeed.., if before the regular statutory enforcement mech-
anisms could at least be brought to bear, the condition complained of caused the
very injury that the Act was intended to prevent. ' ' 1°° Unfortunately, the Com-
mission appears to have lost sight of this original purpose of the right to refuse
work, making it a substitute for, rather than a supplement to the remedies af-
forded for dangerous working conditions in the Act itself. The Commission should
return to the language and intent of the Mine Act, and reserve the right to refuse
work for those serious cases in which the miner has no reasonable alternative to
the work stoppage. The standards of OSHA may not be entirely appropriate under
the Mine Act, but the Commission must place some limitations of severity and
imminence of danger upon the miner's right to walk off the job without sanction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law governing discrimination under the Mine Act has developed consid-
erably since 1980, when the Commission first held that miners have a right to
9, Miller, 687 F.2d at 196 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 195.
Robinette, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 809 n.12.
Id. at 810.
99 Id.
I- Pasula, 2 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 2790.
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refuse work in certain circumstances without retaliation. In most respects, the
emergent law creates a reasonable and equitable balance between mine safety and
mine discipline. However, the Commission consistently has failed to establish any
standard of severity or imminence for hazards that will support protected work
refusals. Unless the Commission soon articulates such a standard to guide mine
management and miners alike, the balance between safety and discipline may be
seriously threatened, and the right of protected work refusals could become more
cancer than cure in the life of our nation's mines.
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